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Informed
Consent, Body
Property, and
Self-Sovereignty
Radhika Rao

R

esearch using human biological materials is
booming, yet many questions regarding such
research remain unanswered. Is informed
consent always necessary for the use of human biological materials in research, and if so, what counts as
informed consent? Is a generalized blanket consent
to all future research sufficient, or must the donors of
biological specimens be provided with full information
about the purposes of the research and affirmatively
consent to each particular use? What about property
rights — does the donor “own” his or her biological
specimen and have a right to control its use? And if
such research leads to patents and commercialization,
does the donor have a right to share in any resulting
profits? Even if donors do not possess property rights,
what about the potential impact of such research upon
the donor’s (and his or her family’s) right to privacy?
Are there special concerns regarding research using
vulnerable populations, such as newborn babies,
indigenous tribes, and others groups who may lack
knowledge and power?
In 2010, a book about an African-American woman
whose cancer cells were taken without her knowledge
or consent to create a valuable cell line became a bestseller.1 Henrietta Lacks, a poor black woman from a
family of tobacco farmers, supplied the cells which
became the first immortal cell line — the HeLa line.
HeLa cells ended up in labs across the country, were
sent to the moon, led to development of the polio
vaccine, improved our understanding of cancer, and
helped pave the way for modern advances in in vitro
fertilization, genetics, and cloning. Yet Henrietta
Lacks’ contributions to science were seldom acknowledged,2 except by the name given to the cell line, and
many in her family remain too poor to afford health
care. Rebecca Skloot, the author of The Immortal Life
of Henrietta Lacks, captures the issue beautifully:
How you should feel about all this isn’t obvious.
Scientists aren’t stealing your arm or some vital
organ. They’re just using tissue scraps you parted
with voluntarily. But still, someone is taking part
of you. And people often have a strong sense of
ownership when it comes to their bodies. Even
tiny scraps of it. Especially when they hear that
someone else might be making money off those
scraps. Or using them to uncover potentially
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damaging information about their genes and
medical histories.3

expand the definition of “human subject” to encompass
human biological materials, regardless of whether the
biospecimens contain identifiable information. Yet
In 2013, researchers published the genome of the HeLa
this requirement would apply only prospectively, and
cell line on open-access databases without obtaining
would be delayed in its implementation until three
consent from the family of Henrietta Lacks, provokyears after publication of the final rule. And even if
ing yet another controversy because the gene sequence
the proposed regulations succeed in expanding the
could reveal certain heritable aspects of Lacks’ DNA,
scope of “human subject” under the Common Rule to
and thus be used to draw inferences about her descenincorporate biological specimens, it does not necessardants.4 Henrietta Lacks’ history captivated the public
ily follow that the doctrine of informed consent would
imagination. Her story also encapsulates the controprovide sufficient protection for the donors of biologiversy over informed consent, and hints at a possible
cal materials. The proposed revisions would require
resolution through the rubric of body property.
only a one-time broad consent for the secondary use
of human biological materials, meaning
the use of biospecimens for a purpose
different from the purpose for which the
Henrietta Lacks’ history captivated the public
biospecimen was originally collected (for
imagination. Her story also encapsulates the
example, research use of tissue samples
initially collected for clinical care). Such
controversy over informed consent, and hints
blanket consent is inadequate to fulfill
at a possible resolution through the rubric of
the promise of informed consent.
body property.
The true challenge of informed consent is that this venerable doctrine often
functions as a charade, a collective fiction
Henrietta Lacks’ cells were taken at a time when
which thinly masks the uncomfortable fact that the
there were no rules requiring informed consent for
subjects of human research are not actually afforded
research using human subjects or human biological
full information regarding the types of research that
materials. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Health and
may be contemplated, nor do they provide meaningHuman Services enacted regulations for the protecful consent. The elaborate bureaucratic formalities by
tion of human subjects, known as the “Common Rule,”
means of which patients seeking medical treatment
which establish the standard governing research that
check off a series of boxes on a multitude of forms are
is supported by the federal government.5 The Comnot a substitute for genuine informed consent. Curmon Rule applies to all research involving human
rently, there are various degrees of consent, which
subjects that is conducted, supported, or otherwise
range from: (1) consent as merely the absence of coersubject to regulation by any federal department or
cion, such as when human biological materials are
agency. Under the Common Rule, a researcher must
obtained through a voluntary transfer; (2) presumed
provide the research subject with information about
consent based upon the failure to opt-out; and (3)
the potential risks and benefits of participating in
actual affirmative consent. If affirmative consent is
research, and must obtain informed consent. But the
construed to encompass blanket consent, it gives the
Common Rule was developed for “research on living,
subjects of human research only the ability to say “yes”
breathing humans, not their disembodied tissues.” 6
or “no,” rather than providing them with a full array
Thus, it applies only to research obtained through
of options and granting them the power to authorize
direct interaction with a living, breathing human
particularized consent to some uses, while withholdbeing, and to human biological specimens that involve
ing consent from other uses. Yet if informed consent
identifiable private information. However, the Comactually required the provision of complete informamon Rule does not apply if the research is not federtion, and mandated particularized consent to each
ally funded, if the human subject is deceased, or if the
type of research use, it would most probably be adminbiological specimens are de-identified, anonymous, or
istratively unworkable.8 Indeed, underlying many of
publicly available.7
the judicial decisions in this area is the fear that the
In September 2015, the U.S. Department of Health
administrative burdens of obtaining consent would
and Human Services announced proposed revisions
impede socially valuable research. 9 Furthermore,
to the Common Rule, through a Notice of Proposed
particularized consent might also result in informaRulemaking (NPRM). The proposed revisions seek to
tion overload, and ultimately diminish or even destroy
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choice. Confronted with a mass of complicated information and a complete menu of options, individuals
are likely to feel overwhelmed, unable to adequately
process the information and choose the appropriate
course of action.10 Thus, informed consent inevitably
requires a choice between whether to provide too little
or too much information.
The Havasupai Tribe’s experience with Arizona
State University vividly illustrates the limits of
informed consent, as Deborah Zoe Laufer brilliantly
reveals in her play on the subject.11 Starting in 1990,
members of the Havasupai Tribe voluntarily gave
blood samples to researchers at Arizona State University in order to determine whether there was a
genetic basis for the high rate of diabetes among tribe
members. The researchers sought but ultimately did
not find a genetic link to diabetes. However, they also
used the stored blood samples to conduct other studies on schizophrenia, the degree of inbreeding, and the
geographical origins of the tribe, even though these
investigations threatened the Tribe’s cultural and
religious values. One of the published papers based
upon research using the blood samples reported a
high degree of inbreeding within the tribe, which
tribe members found offensive. According to Carletta
Tilousi, a member of the Havasupai tribal council,
“We say if you do that, a close relative of yours will
die.”12 And another article suggested that the tribe’s
ancestors had migrated from Asia across the frozen
Bering Sea to arrive in North America, which contradicted the tribe’s traditional religious belief that it had
originated in the Grand Canyon. Members of the tribe
even feared that they had unwittingly contributed to
research that could undermine their right to tribal
land: “Our coming from the canyon, that is the basis
of our sovereign rights,” stated Edmond Tilousi, the
Tribe’s vice-chairman.13
In 2005, Carletta Tilousi and the Havasupai Tribe
filed a lawsuit against the researchers and Arizona
State University in federal district court.14 The plaintiffs alleged eight counts of wrongdoing: (1) breach of
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent; (2) fraud,
misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment; (3)
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) conversion; (5) violation of civil rights; (6)
negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se;
(7) unreasonable disclosure of private facts; and (8)
intentional intrusion upon seclusion. In their first
claim for lack of informed consent, the plaintiffs contended that they donated biological materials solely
for the purpose of diabetes research, so there was no
consent to conduct other research. As Carletta Tilousi,
a member of the Havasupai tribal council, explained,
“I’m not against scientific research. I just want it to be

done right. They used our blood for all these studies,
people got degrees and grants, and they never asked
our permission.”15 But the court ruled that there was
informed consent because the tribe members had
agreed to give their blood voluntarily, and had signed
a form granting blanket consent for research “to study
the causes of behavioral/medical disorders.”16 The
court concluded that their consent was not vitiated by
fraud: “Plaintiffs consented to having blood drawn and
were fully aware of the character of the contact. Thus
their consent is not made ineffective even if defendants did make fraudulent representations to induce
that consent.”17 At best, the Havasupai case holds that
blanket consent is sufficient to satisfy the standard
of informed consent. At worst, the case suggests that
consent exists so long as there was no coercion and
the transfer of biological materials was voluntary, even
if researchers made misrepresentations regarding the
purpose of the research.
The Havasupai case exposes the emptiness of
informed consent, for a form that permits research in
order to study “the causes of behavioral/medical disorders” is so vague and broad as to be virtually meaningless. The tribe members’ consent to diabetes research
clearly did not encompass other types of research,
especially research offensive to their religious and
cultural values. The researcher who performed this
research, Therese Markow, now a professor at the
University of California, San Diego, declared, “I was
doing good science.”18 She defended her actions as ethical, suggesting that the very notion of particularized
consent stems from a failure to understand the fundamental nature of genetic research, where progress
often occurs from studies that do not appear to bear
directly on a particular disease.19 She explained that
the consent form was purposefully simple because
English was a second language for many Havasupai,
and few of the tribe’s 650 members had graduated
from high school.20 Under such conditions, a more
comprehensive consent form, providing complete
information and requiring particularized consent for
each type of research use would not necessarily be
better. Indeed, as the Havasupai experience reveals,
the entire enterprise of informed consent is fraught
with the potential for miscommunication and cultural
misunderstanding, and undermined by its inability to
protect those who lack knowledge and power.
Although the Havasupai Tribe lost the legal battle
because the court dismissed all of its claims, it was
morally vindicated in April 2010, when Arizona State
University (ASU) agreed to a settlement to “remedy the
wrong that was done.”21 ASU agreed to pay $700,000
to 41 members of the Tribe, return the remaining
blood samples, and provide other forms of assistance
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to the Tribe, such as scholarships and help in setting
up a clinic.22 In spite of this moral victory, the legal
opinions in the case demonstrate the inadequacy of
informed consent to articulate and render actionable
claims of cultural and dignitary harms.23
If the doctrine of informed consent fails to provide
adequate protection to the subjects of human research
who donate biological materials, why not turn to the
language of property law? Property is power, as the
legal realist Morris Cohen recognized long ago. In his
classic article on the connection between property
and sovereignty, Cohen warned, “We must not overlook the actual fact that dominion over things is also
imperium over our fellow human beings.”24 Yet current law permits everyone except for those who donate
human biological materials to possess property rights.
The reluctance to invoke property law probably stems
from fears of resurrecting slavery and the commodification of human beings.25 But ironically, the avoidance
of property transforms the subjects of human research
into objects of property that can be owned only by others, resulting in new forms of oppression and exploitation. Human research subjects are autonomous
individuals who should not only possess the power to
contribute their biological materials, but also the right
to help control the course of research, and to share in
the resulting benefits or profits. Conferring body property might enable research subjects to regain power
and a measure of self-sovereignty.
Newborn blood screening programs also illustrate
the ambiguity of informed consent, and exemplify
inconsistent attitudes towards body property. In every
state, blood spots are routinely collected from newborn babies in order to detect and treat a variety of
genetic diseases, often without the parents’ knowledge
or consent. However, Texas and some other states
started to store these blood samples indefinitely and
made them available to others for research use. A
group of Texas parents sued the state health agency for
violating their rights to privacy and liberty under the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, arguing
that the blood spots contained deeply private medical and genetic information that was expropriated
without their knowledge or consent, and a federal district court refused to dismiss their complaint.26 This
resulted in a new law in Texas requiring parents to be
given the opportunity to opt-out of such research, as
well as a settlement agreement which gave the state 70
days to destroy approximately 5 million blood samples
collected from newborn babies over the past 7 years.
Thus, the Texas case resulted in a law that presumes
parental consent unless parents exercise their opportunity to opt-out of newborn screening. In a similar
lawsuit in Minnesota, the state Supreme Court ruled
440

that the state’s dissemination and use of newborn dried
blood samples for research without obtaining written
informed consent violated its Genetic Privacy Act.27
Despite these “Baby DNA lawsuits,” informed consent for newborn screening varies widely from state to
state.28 Many states do not even notify parents about
potential research use of newborn dried blood samples or give them the opportunity to opt-out, let alone
require actual affirmative consent. In 4 states, dried
blood samples are conceptualized as the property of
the state, and in 10 states, the Department of Health is
granted authority over the use of dried blood samples,
although it is unclear who retains ownership.29
In all of these contexts, the legal status of the human
body remains hotly contested. Sometimes human bodies and body parts are classified as objects of property,
while at other times they are characterized as the subject of privacy rights to be protected under informed
consent doctrine, and some are even endowed with
dignity and afforded the status of persons.30 This is
true not only for different types of human tissue; disparate treatment may be accorded the same body part
in different contexts. Thus, the body may be deemed
property for some people but not others, and it may
be treated as property in some contexts but not others.
For example, under California law, human eggs may
be purchased and sold for fertility treatments but not
for purposes of research.31
There are three important cases in which individuals have claimed ownership of their own bodies in the
context of biomedical research. In all three cases, the
courts refused to accord property rights to those who
supply body parts for medical research, although the
same courts were willing to recognize the property
rights of other persons in the body parts themselves
and the resulting products. Almost every student of
property law is familiar with the first case, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California,32 in which the
California Supreme Court ruled that Moore’s spleen
was not his property. At the same time, the court
found that the Mo cell line — which had been created from Moore’s spleen cells and, ironically, named
after him — was the property of the researchers who
had been granted a patent upon it. But Greenberg v.
Miami Children’s Hospital goes one step further than
Moore by holding not only that the blood, tissue, and
other body parts that the Greenbergs had supplied to
researchers were not their property, but also that the
gene responsible for their disease was the property
of the scientists who isolated it and the hospital that
patented it, rather than the persons in whose bodies
it remained.33 And Washington University v. Catalona34 goes far beyond both Moore and Greenberg by
making explicit what was only implicit in those cases.
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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In Catalona, the court concluded that not just intellectual property in the body but also tangible physical
parts of the body (such as blood and tissue samples)
were owned by the university that stored them in its
Genito-Urinary Biorepository; thus, they were not
owned by the patients from whose bodies these biological materials had been derived.35
Why is the law willing to confer property rights
upon some while denying the same rights to others?
At first glance, the lopsided treatment of the human
body seems to stem from the distinction between
physical body parts and intellectual property in the
body. Specifically, body parts are seen as a form of
raw material to be harvested, whereas cell lines and
certain categories of human genes are conceptual-

ply eggs be prevented from treating them as property,
subject to market pricing?
Rejection of property is generally justified by a
paternalistic desire to protect the sources of biological
materials, stemming from fears that commodification
of the human body could lead to coercion or exploitation of vulnerable persons, such as women who donate
their eggs. But ironically, failure to treat the body as
property may actually result in a lack of protection
against the misuse of body parts and enable wrongdoing. This is evident in the egg-stealing scandal that
erupted at UC Irvine in 1995. At the time, prosecutors
were unable to press charges against the physicians
who misappropriated eggs without the knowledge or
consent of women seeking fertility treatments, and

Why is the law willing to confer property rights upon some while denying
the same rights to others? At first glance, the lopsided treatment of the
human body seems to stem from the distinction between physical
body parts and intellectual property in the body.
ized as a kind of man-made technology. 36 Hence,
the “inventor” of intellectual property in the body is
granted broad protection that extends across space
and time, whereas bodily property is conceived as
a tangible thing that is protected only insofar as it
remains in the possession of its “owner,” or that may
be deemed un-ownable and thus not protected at all.
But even physical body parts may receive property
protection when they are in the possession of a university or scientist rather than an ordinary person,
which suggests that the divergence lies deeper than
a distinction between tangible body parts and intellectual property in the body.
Despite the disavowal of property terminology,
property concepts are so pervasive and powerful that
they continue to creep back into the doctrine and the
discourse. In January 2015, for example, a tax court
for the first time addressed the question whether payments received by women for the “donation” of their
eggs constitute taxable income. The court ruled that
women must pay tax on the proceeds from egg sales.37
More recently, several women have filed a lawsuit
challenging limits on the amount of compensation for
egg donors implemented by fertility clinics; the plaintiffs contend that these limits constitute price-fixing
in violation of the antitrust laws.38 But if the IRS may
tax payments to egg sources, and if fertility clinics and
physicians may reap huge profits from the reproductive enterprise, why should only the women who sup-

gave them to other patients. Prosecutors were unable
to prosecute for grand theft, which is defined as the
taking of personal property valued at more than $400,
because it was unclear whether human eggs constitute
“property” under the California precedent of Moore v.
Regents of the University of California. Yet the prosecutors could not prosecute for kidnapping, either,
because human eggs and embryos clearly do not constitute persons under California law. In response to
this scandal, lawmakers were forced to enact new legislation which made the theft of human eggs a crime
and authorized fines of up to $50,000 or penalties of
up to 5 years in prison for the intentional transfer of
human sperm, eggs, or embryos without the written
consent of donors and recipients.39
Moreover, rejection of property in human biological materials does not actually prevent commodification and commercialization of the body. The researchers who invest intellectual capital and the companies
and universities that invest financial capital are permitted to reap profits from human research, so why
not those who provide the human capital in the form
of their own bodies? If the concern is commodification and commercialization, why should everyone but
the donor possess property rights and be permitted
to share in the profits from human research? Such
a lopsided system appears to demand altruism from
the subjects of human research, while enabling everyone but the person who donated the raw materials to
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commodify, commercialize, and ultimately profit from
human biological materials. Henrietta Lacks’ daughter, Deborah, criticizes the asymmetric altruism which
underlies the lack of bodily property, saying, “But I
always have thought it was strange, if our mother cells
done so much for medicine, how come her family can’t
afford to see no doctors? Don’t make no sense. People
got rich off my mother without us even knowin’ about
them takin her cells, now we don’t get a dime.”40
Such expectations of asymmetric altruism appear
even more troubling when imposed in ways that
reflect and reinforce underlying racial, gender, and
other hierarchies. For example, inconsistent attitudes
towards the compensation of sperm and egg donors
may embody an assumption that egg donations should
result from pure altruism, rather than self-interest.41
To the extent that such assumptions are invoked when
women are providing material that is intertwined with
reproduction, they may stem from deep-seated stereotypes regarding the natural role of women as altruistic
and the natural sphere of woman as the family, which
should be kept separate from the market. The use of
African-Americans and other minority groups, Native
American tribes, such as the Havasupai, and newborn
babies in human research also raises such concerns.
If the rejection of property is problematic, why not
embrace property? In his influential Commentaries,
William Blackstone portrayed property as the “sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”42 Despite this pervasive image, property
does not necessitate Blackstone’s vision of an absolute
and individual right.43 Instead, according to Hohfeldian theory, property is conceptualized as a bundle of
rights, so property need not be all or nothing. Individuals need not possess every stick in the bundle
of rights: they may have the right to possess and the
right to exclude others, but not the right to buy, sell, or
destroy. Moreover, the concept of property as a bundle
of rights means that it is possible to disaggregate the
various sticks in the bundle and apportion them to
different parties. Hence, different sticks in the bundle
of rights with respect to biological materials could be
allocated to different individuals, or even shared by a
family, a group, or the public collectively.
Property provides a powerful framework that is
capable of addressing the manifold attributes of human
biological materials. First, human biological materials are not just physical objects; they also incorporate
genetic information. Property encompasses the dual
character of biological materials as tangible things as
well as intellectual property.44 Moreover, biological
materials may undergo multiple transfers and end up
442

in the hands of those who possess no connection to
the donor. Property rights provide ongoing protection
because they are in rem, meaning that they run with the
object or thing and are enforceable against the whole
world, unlike contractual rights, which are in personam, meaning that they bind only the parties to the
agreement or contract. In addition, property provides
a mechanism that is able to mediate conflicts not just
against the government and outsiders (who are nonowners), but also among multiple owners of a valuable resource. The framework of property is perfectly
designed to accommodate shared interests among
multiple owners of a resource because property can be
distributed between many owners simultaneously, and
it can also be divided over time, with current interests
belonging to some individuals and future interests to
others. Indeed, property is conceptualized as a bundle
of rights, so that different sticks in the bundle may be
disentangled and allocated to different persons. Thus,
some persons may possess the right to exclude, while
others may possess the right to use or to transfer to others. Finally, property offers a variety of flexible forms
to accommodate different types of shared ownership
interests, including the trust, which divides legal and
equitable title; joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and
tenancy by the entirety; the partnership and the corporation; as well as a variety of intellectual property
regimes. Indeed, some scholars explicitly analogize
overlapping familial interests in genetic information to
various forms of shared property.45
Property is a flexible concept that may afford power
to research participants, transforming them from
mere research subjects into partners or shareholders
who possess a measure of autonomy and control over
the research enterprise, whereas a lack of property
in their own bodies may leave persons vulnerable to
abuse and exploitation. The controversy over the publication of the HeLa genome led to one type of creative
approach to these problems. Following discussions,
Henrietta Lacks’ family and the National Institutes
of Health reached an innovative agreement to form
the HeLa Genome Data Access Working Group,
which is composed of researchers and two members
of Lacks’ family. This group controls access to the
HeLa genome; thus it could be viewed as investing
limited property rights to shared genetic information
in Henrietta Lacks’ family. The NIH has requested all
researchers who generate or use genomic data from
HeLa cells to include an acknowledgment of the
contribution of Henrietta Lacks and the continued
generosity of her family. According to the NIH, “the
relationship between researchers and participants is
evolving: seeking permission emphasizes that participants are partners, not just ‘subjects’”; thus this plan
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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The Michigan BioTrust imaginatively incorporates and reframes
an ancient property mechanism — the trust — to provide a paradigm for
a biobank that treats the donors of biological materials not just as objects
of property or even subjects of human research, but rather as full-fledged
partners and shareholders in the research enterprise.
reflects a “true partnership between the Lacks family
and the biomedical research community.”46
Similarly, controversy over the use of newborn
blood samples in Michigan prompted the establishment of the Michigan BioTrust for Health, pursuant
to which the state’s citizens are granted a communal
right to benefit from research using a valuable public resource.47 Dried blood spots are collected from
newborns under a mandatory public health program,
but the state retains the blood samples indefinitely
for research use. In 2008, the Michigan Department
of Community Health created the Michigan BioTrust
after convening a roundtable of experts to discuss the
issues and determine policy. The roundtable determined that parental consent would be required, not for
newborn screening itself, but for subsequent research
use of the blood samples after October 1, 2010 (the
Michigan Department of Community Health IRB
granted a waiver of consent for blood samples that
were already stored prior to May 1, 2010, based on
the impracticability of obtaining consent for some 4
million specimens dating back to 1984). The roundtable concluded that under Michigan law, the Michigan Department of Community Health has “qualified
ownership” of dried blood samples collected for newborn screening; thus it is required to act as a fiduciary
and exercise control over the biological specimens for
the benefit of the child and the public. Accordingly,
the Michigan BioTrust makes the blood samples available for research to benefit the public health, but not
for research on non-medically useful cosmetic products. Moreover, the governing structure of the Michigan BioTrust includes a Community Values Advisory
Board to represent the citizens of Michigan regarding
the types of research that would be deemed appropriate by laypeople in the state. Thus, the state of Michigan has actually built a biobank that is modeled upon
the charitable trust, implementing the seminal scholarship of David Winickoff.48 The Michigan BioTrust
imaginatively incorporates and reframes an ancient
property mechanism — the trust — to provide a paradigm for a biobank that treats the donors of biological materials not just as objects of property or even
subjects of human research, but rather as full-fledged
partners and shareholders in the research enterprise.
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